Wednesday, April 15, 2009

NUCLEAR SECURITY: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained

NUCLEAR SECURITY: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained

April 15, 2009
Highlights of GAO-09-321, a report to congressional committees
In April 2008, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) found significant weaknesses, particularly in LLNL’s protective force’s ability to assure the protection of weapons-grade (special) nuclear material. LLNL is overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, and managed by a contractor. NNSA is planning to remove most of the special nuclear material from LLNL. GAO was asked to (1) characterize security deficiencies identified in the 2008 inspection; (2) determine the factors that contributed to these deficiencies; (3) identify LLNL’s corrective actions to address security deficiencies; and (4) assess LLNL’s plan to permanently remove the riskiest special nuclear material from its site. To conduct this work, GAO visited LLNL, reviewed numerous documents and plans, and interviewed LLNL and NNSA security officials.

What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of NNSA improve and sustain federal oversight of security at LLNL by (1) developing a detailed plan and budget for training NNSA’s Livermore Site Office (LSO) security staff and (2) providing financial incentives to LLNL’s contractor to sustain security improvements. NNSA generally agreed with the report’s findings and recommendations.


Technorati Tags:
,


No comments:

Post a Comment